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INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR REGULATING FINANCIAL
REPORTING
Charles T. HORNGREN *
Within the context of the current approach to the regulation of financial reporting, Professor
Horngren focuses upon the standard -setting process. He first examines the SEC- FASB approach and
discusses criticisms which have been made by the business community. Positing that the setting of
accounting standards has not been accurately depicted by any model of the policy-making process,
Horngren suggests a series of factors that accounting researchers should investigate in order to
construct a more accurate model. He concludes that while alternatives exist to the current arrangement,
the SEC- FASB model is viable because it is responsive to criticisms, and combines the expertise of
the private sector with the oversight of the SEC.
I. Introduction
When David Solomons asked me to prepare an article for this conference,
he suggested that it might be called "Institutional Alternatives for Regulating
Financial Reporting." He said: "The best way for me to indicate what we are
looking for here is to formulate a number of questions. How might the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approach its statutory duty to
regulate financial reporting [1]? By a hands-off policy and reliance on the
market? By encouraging self-regulation? By emphasis on disclosure, leaving
registrants free to choose their own measurement rules? By delegation to a
private sector body? This session will not deal with the regulation of the
accounting profession."
My article offers a general response to these questions. My focus will be on
the setting of standards for financial reporting rather than standards for
auditing or standards for a practitioner within the accounting profession. My
scope is narrowed, but it still covers a broad area.
There are many fundamental questions about the SEC and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) [2] that underlie the question of institu-
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tional alternatives for regulating financial reporting. Except indirectly, this
article will not encompass the following: (1) Why does regulation exist? (2)
What are the relative roles of efficiency and equity as criteria for setting
accounting standards? (3) How should the regulators be judged? How can the
social effects of regulation be evaluated [3]?
2. The existing arrangement
2.1. Nature of the standard-setting task
The literature on management control has various descriptions of how goals
should be chosen, organizations should be structured, and systems should be
designed to aid the management of processes [4]. In essence, most organiza-
tions have the task of creating or obtaining some product or service that fulfills
customers' demands.
In our democratic society, there is a demand for an unusual product:
accounting standards [5]. The customers are numerous and varied. Examples
include bankers, financial analysts, public accountants, financial executives,
chief executive officers, and stockholders. Consider the relationships shown in
fig. 1.
In some organizations, such as a manufacturing company, the process [6] is
well-specified, the environment [7] is easily controlled, and the relationship
between inputs and outputs is predictable and easily measured. Moreover. the
value of the output is easy to determine, and the quality of the output is easy
to ascertain. In short, the world of a manufacturing company is often relatively
simple [8].
In contrast, the production of financial accounting standards is fantastically
complex. The inputs encompass information of all kinds, including research
evidence and a spectrum of opinions. The environment is characterized by a
high level of uncertainty, including the various likelihoods of acceptability,
usefulness, and economic consequences. The value of the output is difficult to
ascertain, and the quality of the output is inevitably questioned.
Inputs Process Outputs
(Information, opinions (Deliberations, pre- (Financial accounting
research) -- dictions, decisions) -* standards)
T
Environment
Fig. 1
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2.2. The existing arrangement
The complexity of setting financial accounting standards requires a richer
model of the process and the environment than that just depicted. This
audience knows the existing institutional arrangement for the production of
financial accounting standards [9]. However, our individual descriptions of the
arrangements and the processes would surely differ. Each of us would em-
phasize different aspects and critical relationships.
Fig. 2 portrays my perception of the existing arrangements [10]. To me, the
relationships are similar to decentralized management in industry. Congress,
via the Securities Act of 1933 [11], gave the SEC the primary responsibility for
prescribing accounting standards (principles) [12]. In turn, the SEC had
delegated a large part of the work to the private sector, in recent years
principally to the Accounting Principles Board (APB) and its successor, the
FASB.
As fig. 2 implies, the present institutional arrangement is a public
sector-private sector relationship. The private sector has been delegated plenty
of encouragement and decision-making power from the public sector - but the
public sector is the boss [13].
This model directly addresses several commonly held myths about the
current regulatory process:
Comparison to Private Business
-------------------- n
SU.S. Congress Board of directors
I I
SEC] Chief executive officer
LJ
[Key subordinate managers
F Users. including in- C
vestors, managers, auditors Customers
Company output is
pronouncements that govern
the preparation of
published financial reports.
Fig. 2. Diagram of institutional relationships for production of financial accounting standards.
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Myth a. The private sector sets financial accounting standards [14]. Consider
the following remark: "We must keep standard-setting in the private sector."
It is not exclusively in the private sector now. A more accurate statement is:
"We must preserve the role of the private sector in standard-setting, at least to
the extent that it now exists."
Myth b. "The private sector sets financial accounting standards, and the
SEC enforces the standards" [15]. The SEC plays a variety of roles in this
entire picture, including enforcement [16]. But the private sector's role is
overseen by the SEC [17].
Myth c. "The SEC and FASB are partners in setting financial accounting
standards" [18]. They are not partners in the classical sense of each having an
equal voice. The SEC is the managing partner [19].
2.3. Complaints about the existing arrangement
I am helped by analogies, even if they are strained. The SEC and the FASB
are like the referees at the Super Bowl, who have an unusual objective. They
try to minimize rather than maximize. That is, they want to minimize the
hisses, catcalls, and brickbats. Have you ever seen referees get a standing
ovation for a job well done? Similarly, the compliments for the SEC and FASB
are rare, but the boos are frequent [20]. Their objective is often to minimize the
boos. (However, the regulators simultaneously want to improve financial
reporting [21]. Decision scientists might describe the regulators' problem as an
example of goal programming.)
As a current trustee of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), I have
heard and read complaints about the Foundation and the Financial Account-
ing Standards Board. The messages are mixed, but consider some highlights.
(1) Many observers are especially disappointed about the lack of a more
concrete conceptual framework and the inconsistent positions through a series
of Board pronouncements [22]. Of course, similar complaints have been voiced
since explicit regulation commenced fifty years ago [23].
(2) Members of Congress and their staffs have complained about the FASB
since its inception [24]. These laments have varied, but a major criticism is that
the private sector has too much power [25].
(3) Chief executive officers and chief financial officers grumble about the
personnel and the process. First, there are not enough representatives of
business on the FAF board of trustees, on the FASB, and on the FASB staff;
too few FASB members and staff are sympathetic to the problem of the real
world [26]. And second, the FASB does not really listen to the written and oral
suggestions from business [27]; the FASB's due process is a sham [28]; the
FASB staff has too much power [29].
Of course, similar complaints about regulation have been voiced by business
managers for many years. The tide rises and falls, and it is heavily affected by
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the nature of the specific technical issues facing the FASB.
The repetition of history is sobering. As I wrote the above words, I was
reminded of past criticisms of the APB. When the FASB was formed, the
executive vice president of the American Institute of CPAs commented:
Can it be that the APB has been replaced not because of structural deficiencies but because
of prevailing attitudes - attitudes within the public accounting profession and the attitude
of business?
Is it possible that too many accountants and businessmen have been so determined to have
their own way on matters of accounting principles that they preferred to bring down the
structure rather than submit to an APB Opinion that impinged on their prerogatives [30]?
The managers' quest for power is unending and understandable. Managers
perceive their stake in the output of the FASB as being larger than any other
interested party [31].
3. Phenomena of political power
3.1. Model of conditions of power
Academicians prefer tidy, rational decisions. Nevertheless few FASB pro-
nouncements turn out that way. Just as war is too important to be left to the
generals, business executives, members of Congress, and many others believe
that accounting is too important to be left to the technicians. There are
struggles for power.
Moonitz and Sterling view "the problem as a power struggle between
management and accountants. Managements want such things as diversity and
flexibility, and accountants want to tell it like it is" [32].
If power is an important determinant of the output of the standard-setting
process, accountants might benefit from studying fundamentals. What is power
and how is it used? Here are two brief definitions:
Power - the ability of one social actor, A, to get another social actor B, to do something
that B would not otherwise have done (33].
Politics - "activities taken ... to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to
obtain one's preferred outcomes in a situation where there is uncertainty or dissensus about
choices" [34].
Jeffrey Pfeffer is a leading scholar in the area of power and organizations.
Fig. 3 shows his model of the conditions producing the use of power and
politics [35].
Although Pfeffer's model is related primarily to power within organizations
[36], many of his ideas pertain to the setting of financial accounting standards.
Consider interdependence, the first condition of the use of power [37]. When
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Fig. 3. A model of the conditions producing the use of power and politics in organizational
decision-making.
the FASB issues a new Statement [38], it affects auditors, managers, and other
interested parties. If there were no interdependence, there would be no cause
for conflict or interaction among the parties.
The second condition of the use of power is inconsistent goals, called
heterogeneous goals by Pfeffer [39]. When the FASB wants more lease and
pension obligations recognized, many managers want just the opposite.
Heterogeneous beliefs about technology is the third condition of the use of
power [40]. Some observers felt strongly that the economy would suffer dire
consequences from the banning of the flow-through method for accounting for
the investment tax credit [41]. Other observers disagreed [42].
Scarcity is the fourth condition of the use of power [43]. If a proposed
accounting standard is perceived to affect the allocation of economic resources,
effort will be expended to influence the decision. For example, managers of
some insurance companies, petroleum companies, and conglomerates believed
that substantial economic harm would result from proposed standards.
Accordingly, these managers tried to wield power to affect the outcome [44].
As an audit partner remarked to me in the late 1970s, "Accounting doesn't
advance on theory, only when somebody's money is at stake."
As fig. 3 indicates, together the four conditions produce conflict [45]. Will
the conflict lead to the use of power, that is, politics? It depends on two other
conditions. First, the issue or resource must be deemed important [46]. Second,
the power must be dispersed [47]. Political activity occurs primarily when
authority and power are dispersed in the social system [48]. In the case of
standard-setting in a democratic society, these two conditions are always
present. The issues are regarded as important and difficult, and the authority
and power are not centralized.
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When these conditions exist, the use of power is virtually certain. Moreover,
Pfeffer claims that power is the only way to arrive at a decision:
Given conflicting and heterogeneous preferences and goals and beliefs about the relation-
ship between actions and consequences, interdependence among the actors who possess
conflicting preferences and beliefs, and a condition of scarcity so that not all participants
can get their way, power is virtually the only way (except, perhaps, to use chance) to resolve
the decision. There is no rational way to determine whose preferences are to prevail, or
whose beliefs about technology should guide the decision. There may be norms, social
customs, or tradition which dictate the choice, but these may be all efforts to legitimate the
use of power to make its appearance less obtrusive. In situations of conflict, power is the
mechanism, the currency by which the conflict gets resolved. Social power almost inevitably
accompanies conditions of conflict, for power is the way by which such conflicts become
resolved...
[Aind when there is neither agreement on goals nor on technology, an unstructured, highly
politicized form of decision-making is likely to occur [491.
3.2. Model of accounting policy-making
For the past fifteen years or more, I have been fascinated by the power
plays in accounting policy-making. In particular, consider the maneuvers in
conjunction with APB Opinions on income tax allocation [50], business combi-
nations and goodwill [51] and proposed APB Opinions on marketable equity
securities [52] and on the investment tax credit [53]. In addition, consider the
FASB experiences with foreign currency translation [54], leases [55], petroleum
[56], changing prices [57], and pensions [58]. Interest groups have pushed and
pulled, trying to influence the final output of the standard-setting body. Above
all, these antics have convinced me that our time-honored emphasis on
conceptual frameworks and technical problems of measurement, although
necessary, is inadequate. The FASB realizes this much better than did the
APB, but its critics often see only part of the picture [59].
Many decision-making models have been described and advocated in eco-
nomics, political science, organizational behavior, and other fields. Examples
are the rational [60], bureaucratic [61], and market models [62]. But a model of
political power may offer the most complete explanation of how financial
accounting standards are set [63].
The process of setting accounting standards is often called policy-making.
The process is a collection of activities by which individuals or groups in power
choose general rules for action that may affect others within an organization or
perhaps affect an entire society [64]. Raymond Chambers described policy-
making as "'choosing which' when the choice is a matter of opinion or taste or
some other personal or organizational criterion, and not simply a matter of
technology" [65].
Described another way, the model of accounting policy-making has two
major features: technology and political action. The process of accounting
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policy-making entails making value judgments. It involves applying the tech-
nology of the accounting discipline to controversial issues. In addition, it
includes considering the issues in light of the political and educational prob-
lems of achieving general acceptance of the outputs.
3.3. Problem of social choice
The academic literature characterizes the accounting policy-making process
as a problem of social choice [66]. The choice involves an assessment of the
consequences of policy decisions on assorted constituencies such as managers,
auditors, and investors. The policy decision is made after considering which
configuration of consequences is most attractive. Tradeoffs are inevitably
weighed among the interests of the affected groups.
The FASB has referred to its conceptual framework as a constitution, which
clearly implies a social choice perspective [67]. The latter specifies the powers
of various groups (constituencies). When preferences differ, the constitution
says who will dominate. For example, the president may veto a bill and
Congress may be able to override the veto. Similarly, the FASB may favor an
accounting standard on petroleum accounting and the SEC may override the
FASB [68]. However, note that the FASB cannot veto the SEC [69].
3.4. Importance of technology
The social choice decision is influenced by power and preference [70]. The
critical element is the set of individuals or coalitions with sufficient power to
force a choice. In any situation, if we can identify who has the power, we can
frequently predict what choices will occur [71].
My plea to accounting researchers is to increase their investigation of the
literature of organizations, collective choice, social welfare, political action, and
social change [72]. In this way, all of us will eventually obtain more accurate
models of the policy-making process in accounting.
Make no mistake. I favor research in accounting technology, including the
development of objectives, a conceptual framework and how to account for
specific issues such as leases and pensions. Still, such research is not enough. A
major purpose of such research is to increase the likelihood of acceptability. As
I see it, the more compelling the logic and empirical evidence, the greater the
chance of gaining support from diverse interests.
3.5. Lessons from conceptual framework
For nearly fifty years, leaders in accounting policy-making have sought a
conceptual framework [73]. After millions of dollars and ten years, the FASB
seems to be reducing the intensity of this frustrating quest. Why? At the risk of
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oversimplification, I submit that the perceived expected additional costs exceed
the benefits.
Suppose a specific conceptual framework is developed. The likelihood of its
acceptance within the Board and its general acceptance outside the Board is
too small to warrant gigantic effort. Phrased differently, the issues are deemed
important and the power is dispersed. Hence, in Pfeffer's words (as quoted
earlier): "And when there is neither agreement on goals nor on technology, an
unstructured, highly politicized form of decisionmaking is likely to occur" [74].
Given that political actions will be omnipresent and everlasting, our expecta-
tions must include a series of pronouncements that are laced with compromises
and inconsistencies.
3.6. Roles of individuals and groups
I welcome recent attempts to model the political aspects of accounting
policy-making [75]. Still, I fear that it is impossible to build a model that will
accurately encompass all the relationships and dynamics of the continuing
process. Nevertheless, this research is encouraging. Our understanding of the
process of accounting policy-making is deeper in 1984 than in 1959 than in
1934. More of us now recognize that technical analysis helps, but it alone is
insufficient for resolving policy issues.
Any analysis of the policy-making process should not overlook the dy-
namics of small groups. The key decisions usually reside in the hands of a
board, a commission, or a committee. Each member has an individual techni-
cal conceptual framework and a way of dealing within the group. Some
members are more influential than others. Sometimes one or two individuals
can effectively block actions that are desired by a majority. On the other hand,
sometimes a persuasive leader can achieve surprising results.
3.7. Role of the chief accountant
Researchers should give more attention to "points of leverage" in their
models [76]. By points of leverage, Bauer means "a person, institution, issue, or
subsystem that has the capacity to effect a substantial influence on the output
of the system" [77].
The chief accountant of the SEC [78] is perhaps the most powerful individ-
ual continuing point of leverage in accounting policy-making. That leverage
has been exerted differently by different chief accountants. Consider two.
In 1974, after intensive political actions by various groups, the APB gave up
its attempt to require the use of market values for accounting for marketable
securities [79]. Shortly thereafter I commented:
The failure of the APB to reach even an exposure draft stage for so obvious a candidate for
fair value as marketable securities reinforces my pessimism about fair value as a goal over
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the next ten to twenty or more years. After all, if the fair value idea cannot be implemented
for that category of assets, there is little practical hope for more radical schemes [80].
That prediction has held up as far as audited financial reports are con-
cerned. But I was wrong regarding disclosures. Four years later, despite forty
years of opposition to departures from historical cost, the SEC required
disclosures of replacement costs for inventories and plant and equipment [81].
As chief accountant, John C. Burton persuaded the SEC to mandate fair
values. This was a revolutionary requirement.
Why do I mention these experiences? Because strong influential leaders can
make a difference, especially if they are at points of leverage in the process.
And timing counts too. For example, as chief accountant of the SEC, Andrew
Barr had a well-known aversion to upward departures from historical costs. If
Barr were sitting in Burton's chair in 1976, I wonder if the replacement cost
requirements would have beren issued.
Similarly, if Burton had been sitting in Barr's chair in 1971, I wonder if the
results regarding marketable securities would have been different. Also keep in
mind that the lobbying groups regarding replacement costs in 1976 were much
more subdued than those regarding marketable securities in 1969-1971.
3.8. FASB and SEC leadership and general acceptance
Please do not misinterpret my focus on political action and general accep-
tance. The latter does not mean that votes of constituents must be counted on
every issue. Majority acceptancee is unnecessary for successful policy-making.
Widespread support certainly eases the choice, but general acceptance can
sometimes be attained even in the face of resistance by a large majority.
The FASB and the SEC must exert leadership. They cannot be merely
reactive bodies. If they confine themselves to vote-counting, sooner or later
society will replace them.
Leadership includes anticipating problems before others see them, tackling
tough problems, and obtaining enough support from the key players to resolve
the issues. The SEC, APB, and FASB have exerted leadership in many areas,
including accounting for changing prices, interperiod income tax allocation,
foreign currency translation, and leases. They have also led without much
success in other areas. The investment tax credit is an example [82]. The jury is
still out regarding pensions [83].
4. Nine alternatives
Because I was asked to consider institutional alternatives, this final section
will comment on the nine competing choices in Table 1. Obviously any set
could have many variations. These choices represent alternatives within the
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Table I
Some institutional alternatives for regulation
Alter- Major producer of Major holder Assessment of
natives formal financial of power feasibility
accounting standards or likelihood
I Private sector FASB or other Negligible
non-AICPA body
2 Private sector AICPA Negligible
3 Private sector Free market Negligible
4 Public sector SEC High
5 Public sector Agency of Congress Low
Like CASB
6 Public sector Comptroller-General Infeasible
or other individual
7 Public-private SEC-AICPA Negligible
sector
8 Public-private Private sector Negligible
sector accounting court
and public sector
judicial system
9 Public-private SEC-FASB Exists now
sector
spectrum of possibilities. My evaluations are heavily affected by my percep-
tions of how power would reside among constituencies.
The first three alternatives would remove power from the public sector.
Deregulation by the government would entail the abolition of the SEC powers
without substituting some other government powers. Although such actions
would engender applause by many interested parties, I assess a tiny probability
(easily less than .10) of their occurrence during our professional lives.
Each of the first three alternatives has appeal to various interest groups.
Consider the first alternative. The FASB would probably welcome enhance-
ment of its power. The SEC would not be there to influence the Board's
agenda, to constrain its options, or to veto its solutions.
The second alternative would result in the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) [84] having more power than it ever had during
the APB days. Many practitioners would be happy because regulation would
be conducted by the body of professioinals who best understand the technical
and practical aspects of the job. The generals would be in charge.
The third alternative would return to the earlier years of this century. There
would be no formal regulation whatsoever. Accounting practices would be
governed by market forces. There would be hurrahs from many interested
parties, especially the followers of Milton Friedman. However, among the three
alternatives, this has the lowest probability of happening. Why? Because the
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practitioners in general demand some form of regulation [85]. Without rules to
be cited, auditors might face ever tougher competition and stormier discussions
with clients. Many auditors prefer to tell a client that the rulebook states that
you must account for the transaction in a specified way. On balance, some
regulation reduces confrontations and makes professional life easier rather
than harder.
Alternatives four, five, and six would remove power from the private sector.
The collective probability of such actions is much greater than the collective
probability of the opposite actions (the removal of power from the public
sector). Why? Mainly because alternative four, power residing solely in the
SEC, has been discussed again and again since 1934 [86]. The Commission
itself or Congress already has the power to take such actions if either is
sufficiently unhappy with the existing institutional arrangements [87]. More-
over, suppose Congress is also sufficiently unhappy with the SEC. Then
alternative five, the creation of an agency of Congress like the Cost Accounting
Standards Board (CASB) [88], has more than a negligible probability.
The sixth alternative is to have a single person, such as the Comptroller
General [89] or the SEC chief accountant [90], as the sole authority. This
alternative might be pleasing to some holders of these positions, but not to
others. For instance, several well-known professors would be glad to hold such
a position. In any event, I have labeled this alternative as infeasible. Why?
Because as long as we have a democratic society we will have no king of
accounting.
The final three alternatives are public-private sector arrangements. Alterna-
tive seven would return to the SEC-AICPA days of the Committee on
Accounting Procedure (CAP) [91] and the APB. In total, those lasted for
almost thirty years, but they were finally found wanting for reasons well-docu-
mented elsewhere [92]. Consequently, I assess a negligible probability to
restoring that mode.
Alternative eight would create an accounting court [93]. There are variations
of this idea. For example, the body of financial accounting standards might be
largely developed by case law [94]. There would be an appeals process. The
courts in the public sector would always be a last resort. I assess a negligible
probability to this alternative. Why? Mainly because those parties now in
power would probably strongly resist such a radical rearrangement and trans-
fer of authority to too few persons.
The ninth alternative, the existing SEC-FASB arrangement, has a high
likelihood of surviving in its basic form for a long time. Indeed, I think it is
more likely than the fourth alternative, regulation by the SEC alone. Such an
intangible asset should last at least forty years. Given our democracy and the
political power model, the existing arrangement has many appealing qualities.
For example, all interested constituencies have ample opportunities to express
their opinions.
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Table 2
Outcome My assessed
probabilities
1. More enlightened governance 0.05
2. Not much difference 0.75
3. Stultifying bureaucratic control 0.20T70
If the existing institutional arrangement is changed dramatically, an exclu-
sive public sector arrangement is the most likely next step. At least three
categories of predictions have been made, as shown in table 2.
The performance of government regulation of accounting standards by
foreign governments and by some U.S. federal agencies is unimpressive to
some and disturbing to many. For example, adherence to the rigid accounting
rule of the Interstate Commerce Commission inhibited desirable changes in
railroad accounting for many years.
The best performance by the public sector that I anticipate is "not much
difference." The extremes of enlightened governance or hobbling control are
less probable. However, the prospect of hobbling seems higher. Consider what
might occur: government agencies might get less direct support from the
private sector. An active private body (such as the FASB) would probably
wither. An understaffed public body would have to resolve more accounting
issues directly. Progressive change would probably diminish. Consequently, I
do not favor a complete government takeover of setting financial accounting
standards.
5. Conclusion
Expectations sometimes lead to satisfying surprise and sometimes lead to
sad disappointment. The level of the pleasure or pain is a function of the level
of expectations. High expectations and inherent complexity often conflict. Do
we expect too much? Do our expectations of a tidy conceptual framework and
a well-knit series of standards square with reality?
The setting of financial accounting standards occurs in a democratic society.
We should use a model of power and politics when we appraise our institu-
tional arrangement. I desire improvements as much as the next accountant. But
one person's improvement is frequently the other person's impairment.
My major point is that countless uncertainties and the problems of measure-
ment and disclosure will still be there - regardless of whether accounting
standards are set by the private sector, the public sector, or both. We should
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
C. T Horngren / Regulatingfinancial reporling
not expect notably more "accuracy" or more "truth" merely because a more
active role in setting standards is taken by one sector or another.
Judgments about measurement and disclosure are usually best made after
give-and-take among informed persons. To serve the public interest, the SEC
and the FASB have employed long processes of research and opinion-gather-
ing. This takes time, much more time than many individuals prefer. Neverthe-
less, short-cuts are dangerous, especially in a democratic society.
In summary, the cooperative public-private method of setting financial
accounting standards is probably the best way to obtain continued improve-
ments. The federal authorities have the best of both imperfect worlds. The
SEC has the major power. It has minimal resources, but it has an eager,
well-financed private sector body that investigates almost all the topics chosen
by federal authorities.
Some superb technical minds are being voluntarily provided to the SEC at
no direct cost. Moreover, there is no evidence that the FASB has lacked
integrity or subverted the public interest, however defined. Finally, the strong
oversight (indeed, active participation) of the SEC and other government
bodies in the standard-setting process can continue and, if necessary, be
strengthened.
We will continue to muddle through. Let us not wring our hands too much
at the state of our art after fifty years. To many, our conceptual framework is
non-existent, flimsy, or wrong. But at least financial reporting in the United
States is the most highly developed in the world. Let us proceed by improving
measurements and disclosures without too much fretting about our manifold
imperfections.
Keep in mind that we are not confronted with sending a man or woman to
the moon. Compared to that technical feat, the setting of financial accounting
standards is much more complex. As Albert Einstein remarked, "Mathematics
is hard enough, but political science is far too difficult for me."
Notes
[1] The Securities and Exchange Commission was formed pursuant to section 78d of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act]. The SEC's duties are delineated in the various sections
of the Act. A good summary of the SEC's statutory duties and its authority for delegating power is
contained in a letter from Roderick M. Hills, the former chairman of the SEC, to Senator Lee
Metcalf (April 30, 1976), reprinted in Staff of Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting and Management
of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Staff Study on the Accounting Establishment,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as Staff Study].
[2] The Financial Accounting Standards Board was formed concurrently with the Financial
Accounting Foundation (FAF) and the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC)
in 1972. These were formed as the result of recommendations of a seven-man study group
appointed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Board of Directors
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(see hnfra note 84 for information about the AICPA) to study the process of establishing
accounting principles and to make recommendations for improving the process as a result of the
Wheat Study Group's recommendations.
(1) The FAF was established, separate from all existing professional bodies, with a Board
of Trustees nominated by organizations having special expertise and continuing interest
in financial accounting and reporting matters, and consisting of five certified public
accountants in public practice, two financial executives, one accounting educator and
one financial analyst. The principal duties of the Trustees are to appoint members of
the FASB and the FASAC, a public advisory body; to raise funds to support these
organizations; and to review periodically the basic structure of the standard setting
organization.
(2) The FASB was given all authority, functions and power of the AICPA and the FAF's
Trustees for establishing and improving standards of financial accounting and reporting
and the conduct of all activities relating thereto. The FASB has seven full-time, salaried
members independent of all other professional and business affiliations, four of whom
are certified public accountants drawn from. or principally experienced in. public
practice, while the remaining three, who might, but need not, be certified public
accountants, are well-versed in problems of financial accounting and reporting.
(3) A Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council was appointed from the public to
work closely with the FASB in an advisory capacity as to accounting and reporting
matters, with members drawn from a variaty of disciplines with no particular occupa-
tion predominating.
In July of 1973. the AICPA designated the FASB as the successor to the Accounting
Principles Board (APB) in establishing accounting principles for purposes of Rule 203
of the AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics. Rule 203 provides that no accountant who
is a member of the AICPA may opine that financial statements are fairly presented in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles if such statements depart
from an FASB pronouncement or an effective pronouncement of its predecessor
standard-setting bodies, the APB and the Committee on Accounting Procedures, unless
the accountant can demonstrate that due to unusual circumstances the financial
statements would otherwise be misleading.
In December 1973. the SEC reaffirmed its administrative practice and policy of looking
to the accounting profession's authoritative standard-setting body for initiative in
establishing and improving accounting principles and standards. In SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 150. (Dec. 20, 1973), the SEC stated that principles, standards and
practices issued by the FASB and its predecessors were presumptively required to be
applied in financial statements filed with the SEC and that financial statements
applying principles contrary to these accounting principles would be unacceptable in
the absence of an SEC determination to the contrary.
Staff of the Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations, Financial Accounting Foundation and Financial Accounting Board.
Statement of Position on Study Entitled "The Accounting Establishment," (April 14, 1977) at
9-11 [hereinafter cited as Statement of Position]. For another view of the interrelationship of the
AICPA, the FAF, FASB, SEC, and the Financial Accounting Advisory Council, see Staff Study,
supra note 1.
[31 "Accounting disclosure policy affects the distribution of income, making it imperative to
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explicitly incorporate equity considerations in policy deliberations and decisions." Baruch Lev,
Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy 46 (July 1983) (unpublished paper).
[4] E.g., R. Mockler, The Management Control Process (1972); Control and Ideology in
Organizations (G. Salaman & K. Thompson eds. 1980); see also A. Grove, High Output
Management (1983).
15] A survey of 400 corporate executives and leaders in the investment community, the public
accounting profession, government, academia and the financial news media by Louis Harris and
Associates indicate that eighty-six percent believe there is a "great deal of need" for financial
accounting reporting standards. U.S. Survey Assesses Standards and the FASB, CA Magazine, Aug.
1980, at 20.
[6] A process is a collection of decisions or activities that should be aimed at some ends. C.
Horngren, Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis 6 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Horngren]. The decision process is illustrated in id. at 4-7 (see especially Exhibit 1-1).
[7] The environment is the set of uncontrollable factors that affect the success of a process.
Horngren, supra note 6, at 6.
[81 See Horngren, supra note 6, at 7.
[9] See supra note 2.
[10] My previously recorded perceptions have influenced my presentation here. See Horngren,
Accounting Principles: Private or Public Sector?, J. Acct., May 1972, at 37.
[11] Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)) [hereinafter
cited as Securities Act].
[12] In the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, Congress directed the SEC to protect the
public from false and misleading information by requiring publicly-owned corporations to disclose
financial and other information in a manner which accurately depicts the results of corporate
activities. Congress gave the SEC broad authority to establish accounting and reporting standards
as part of its mandate to administer and enforce the provisions of the federal securities laws. Soon
after its creation, the SEC decided by a three to two vote not to exercise its authority to set
accounting standards.
Instead, the SEC decided to rely on accounting standards established in the private sector as
being protective of the public interest, so long as such standards have "substantial authoritative
support." During the ensuing forty years, the AICPA has created three bodies to provide such
support through authoritative pronouncements. A collection of flexible, alternative accounting
standards - called generally accepted accounting principles - has evolved in the private sector to
satisfy the SEC's "substantial authoritative support" test.
The SEC issued a policy statement - Accounting Series Rel. No. 150 - in 1973 which
specifically endoreses the FASB as the only private body where standards will be recognized by the
SEC as satisfying the requirements of the federal securities laws. Staff Study, supra note 1, at
17-18. See SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 150, Statement of Policy on the Establishment and
Improvement of Accounting Principles and Standards (Dec. 20, 1973).
[131 See Newman, The SEC's Influence on Accounting Standards: The Power of the Veto, 19 J.
Acct. Research 134 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Newman]. But see Staff Study, supra note 1, at
17-18.
[14] The Senate Staff Study on the Accounting Establishment insists that "the SEC has
permitted, and even insisted upon, establishment of accounting standards ... by self-interested
private parties. The result has been an extraordinary delegation of public authority and responsi-
bility to narrow private interests." Staff Study, supra note 1, at 17.
[15] This myth is presented in the Senate Staff Study. See Staff Study, supra note 1, at
173-83.
[16] In terms of enforcement, the SEC may, for example, seek injunctions against continuing
violations of federal securities laws or the SEC's rules thereunder. See Securities Act § 20(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1982); Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). In appropriate cases, such
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actions might be premised on violations of the accounting requirements. Letter from Roderick M.
Hills to Senator Lee Metcalf (April 30, 1976). reprinted in Staff Study, supra note 1, at 1456.
[17] The SEC oversees the accounting profession's standard-setting bodies. For example, the
SEC has issued over 200 Accounting Series Releases, some of which have conflicted with, or
effectively amended or superseded standards set by the accounting profession's authoritative
standard-setting bodies. Statement of Position, supra note 2, at 37. For example. in 1975 the SEC
became concerned that gains from early extinguishments of debt, then required by APB Opinions
to be reflected as ordinary income, were inflating earnings of some companies and urged the FASB
to take prompt action indicating that it would do so if the FASB did not. The result was
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 4. Id.
[181 See Paper Shuffling and Economic Reality, J. Acct., Jan. 1973, at 26 (interview with John
Burton); see also Address by William J. Casey, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(Oct. 2, 1972) ("The Partnership Between the Accounting Profession and the SEC").
[191 That the SEC is the managing partner is illustrated both by its veto power. Newman.
supra note 13, at 135. and by recommending specific accounting issues requiring the development
of standards by the FASB. id. at 135 n. 1. The FASB does not have an equal voice. See Horngren,
Tie Marketing of Accounting Standards, J. Acct., Oct. 1973. at 61, 64 ("[I]n relation to the SEC. the
APB is not a 'partner' but is a subordinate.") [hereinafter cited as Horngren, Marketing of
Accounting Standards].
[201 A catalogue of the complaints about the SEC and the FASB is contained in the Staff
Study, supra note 1. The Statement of Position, supra note 2, is the FASB's response to these
various criticisms.
[21] The FASB's and SEC's recent history "has been marked by a number of significant efforts
to improve financial accounting." Statement of Position, supra note 2, at 6.
[22] The Senate Staff Study asserts that "the accounting profession and more recently the
FASB have failed to prescribe a comprehensive set of objectives for financial statements and a
conceptual framework within which further improvements on financial accounting and reporting
can develop consistently.' Statement of Position, supra note 2, at 27. See Staff Study, supra note
1, at 20. See generally Horngren, Uses and Limitations of a Conceptual Framework, J. Acct., Apr.
1981, at 86-95; Pacter, The Conceptual Framework: Make No Mystique About It, J. Acct., July
1983, at 76 [hereinafter cited as Pacter].
[23] Professor Abraham Briloff recounts similar criticisms. In reference to the Committee on
Accounting Procedure, established in 1940, Briloff notes that its efforts "over an 18-year period
were primarily focused on the articulation of existing accounting practices and on pragmatic
solutions to specific problems. Less concern was evidenced with the development of a coherent
conceptual structure." Furthermore, the replacing of the Committee on Accounting Procedure with
the APB in 1959 was conceded, in part, as a means to "the elaboration of a conceptual
framework." However, once again "the emphasis was upon the pragmatic, and the conceptual
effort took a secondary role." Statement by Abraham J. Briloff before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (May 21, 1976),
reprinted in Staff Study, supra note 1, at 1614.
[24] The complaints are summarized at length in Staff Study, supra note 1.
[251 A typical complaint is that the delegation of authority to "private interest groups" has
benefited special interests at the expense of the public. Id. at 17-18.
[26] But see General Statement regarding the Financial Accounting Standards Board's "Meet-
ings with Prominent Public Accountants, Businessmen, and Members of the Academic Commun-
ity," reprinted in Staff Study, supra note 1, at 1347.
[271 A group of financial executives voiced their view that the FASB "was not responsive to
the needs of business, and was, in fact, ignoring input from the business community.' Address by
Marshall S. Armstrong, Third Ann. See. Reg. Inst. (1976), reprinted in Staff Study, supra note 1,
at 1398, 1407 [hereinafter cited as Armstrong].
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[28] See Staff Study, supra note 1, at 16.
[291 Id.
[30] Speech by Leonard M. Savoie, "Financial Accounting Standards: Regulation or Self
Regulation?," Stanford Business School (May 1972), at 1.
[31] Business perceives a threat whenever a proposal could have an adverse effect on its own
financial statements: Armstrong, supra note 27, at 14-16. Indeed, management perceives the
"basic function of financial statements" to be as a "report on management's stewardship of
corporate assets." Id. at 1408.
[32] Sterling, Accounting Power, J. Acct., Jan. 1973, at 65 [hereinafter cited as Sterling]. Sterling
continues: "Given those opposing interests, it seems clear to me that we ought to get management
out of the business of establishing accounting principles...." Id. at 65-66. See Moonitz, Wlty is it
so Difficult to Agree Upon a Set of Accounting Principles?, 38 Austl. Acct. 621 (1968).
[33] Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 Beh. Sci. 201, 202-03 (1957). Bertrand Russell regards
power as "the fundamental concept in social science in the same sense in which energy is the
fundamental concept in physics." B. Russell, Power 3 (1938).
[34] J. Pfeffer, Power in Organizations 7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Pfefferl. Pfeffer continues:
If power is a force, a store of potential influence through which events can be affected,
politics involves those activities or behaviors through which power is developed and used in
organizational settings. Power is a property of the system at rest; politics is the study of
power in action....
... [Plolitical activity is activity which is undertaken to overcome some resistance or
opposition. Without opposition or contest within the organization, there is neither the need
nor the expectation that one would observe political activity.
I'd. Pfeffer distinguishes political activity from activity involved in decision-making that uses
rational or bureaucratic procedures. See infra notes 60-61 & 63 and accompanying text.
[35) Supra note 34, at 69. The numbering of the conditions is added here. See generally id. at
67-96. Pfeffer's model demonstrates that the introduction of power is a "necessary and sufficient
condition" for making a choice. The model indicates when and why power comes to be employed.
Id. at 68. Pfeffer argues that when the conditions in the figure occur, the use of power is virtually
inevitable and, furthermore, it is the only way to arrive at a decision. Id. at 70.
[36] The theme of Pfeffer's book is that power and politics are fundamental concepts for
understanding behavior in organizations. Id. at 1-2.
[371 Pfeffer describes interdependence as
a situation in which what happens to one organizational actor affects what happens to
others. ... Interdependence is an important condition because it ties the organizational
participants together, in the sense that each is now concerned with what the other does and
what the other obtains. In the absence of such interdependence, there would be no basis for
conflict or for interaction among the participants.
Id. at 68-69.
[38] The FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards embody principles, standards
and practices of the accounting profession. The FASB regularly publishes The Current Text of
Accounting Standards, an integration of currently effective accounting and reporting standards.
FASB Accounting Standards: Current Text as of June 1, 1984, at 1 (1984-85 ed.).
[39] Heterogeneous goals are "goals which are inconsistent with each other." Pfeffer, supra
note 34, at 69; see id. at 71-74.
[40] Heterogeneous beliefs about technology are inconsistent beliefs about "the relationship
between decisions and outcomes." Id. at 69, 71-74.
[41] "Many accountants contended that profit from property can come only by using or selling
it and that it should not be possible to show a profit by purchasing property. Therefore they
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argued that the investment tax credit should be shown as a deferred credit rather than an
immediate credit to tax expense and should be taken into income over the life of the asset." T.
Fiflis. H. Kripke. & P. Foster. Accounting for Business Lawyers 747-48 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Fiflis. Kripke & Foster].
[42] Other accountants, companies, and the Treasury argued that the flow-through method had
been passed to help corporations. See id. at 748.
[43] "To the extent that resources are insufficient to meet the various demands of organiza-
tional participants. choices have to be made concerning the allocation of those resources. The
greater the scarcity as compared to the demand, the greater the power and the effort that will be
expended in resolving the decision." Pfeffer. supra note 34. at 69. Scarcity is a vital component of
Pfeffer's model:
Interdependence ... and differences in goals and in perceptions of technology are not
sufficient, by themselves, to produce conflict and the resulting use of power and politics to
reach decisions. It is only when these conditions are coupled with resource scarcity that
conflict and power arise in organizational settings.
Id. at 79.
[44] For a discussion of the activities of petroleum companies regarding proposed standards
for oil and gas accounting and disclosure, see Fiflis, Kripke & Foster, supra note 41, at 232-40.
[451 "[Dlisagreements about cause-effect relations and preferences lead to conflict and.
potentially, the use of power to resolve the choice." Pfeffer, supra note 34. at 74. According to
Pfeffer, goal discrepancies are widely recognized as preconditions for conflict. Id. at 74-79.
146] Where a decision is perceived as less important. "power and politics may not be employed
to resolve the decision because the issue is too trivial to merit the investment of political resources
and effort." Id. at 70. Pfeffer explains:
The use of power requires time and effort. Moreover, power typically is not inexhaustible.
Votes or favors called in on one issue may not be available for use in other decisions. Thus.
the use of resources that provide power, and power itself, is husbanded. Just as there is no
need to use power in the absence of scarcity, there is no desire to use power to affect
decisions that are not perceived as being important or critical to the organization's
operations.
Id. at 85.
[47] "When power is highly centralized, the centralized authority makes decisions using its own
rules and values. The political contests that sometimes occur in organizations take place only
because there is some dispersion of power and authority in the social system." Id. at 70. In terms
of the actors in the system. Pfeffer argues that "when power is highly concentrated, the other
participants in the system have little ability or motivation to engage in a contest for control which
provokes the visible conflict and political activity observed when power is more equally distrib-
uted." Id. at 87.
[48] See id. at 86-88.
[49] Id. at 70-71.
[50] Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 11, Accounting for Income Taxes (1967).
[51] Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16, Business Combinations (1970): Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 17, Intangible Assets (1970).
[52] For a discussion of the maneuvers in the case of marketable equity securities, see
Horngren, Marketing of Accounting Standards, supra note 19, at 63-64.
[53] For a discussion of these maneuvers in the case of the investment tax credit, see Fiflis.
Kripke & Foster, supra note 41, at 747-49.
[54] Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 8, Accounting for the Translation of
Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial Statements (1975).
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[55] For a discussion of these maneuvers in the case of leasing, see Fiflis, Kripke & Foster,
supra note 41, at 755-59.
[56] Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 19. Financial Accounting and Report-
ing by Oil and Gas Producing Companies (1977). For a discussion of these maneuvers in the case
of oil and gas accounting and disclosure, see Fiflis, Kripke & Foster, supra note 41, at 232-40.
[57] Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 33, Financial Reporting and Changing
Prices (1979) (discusses four general methods of measuring income and capital).
[58] FASB, Preliminary Views, Employer's Accounting for Pensions and Other Post-employ-
ment Benefits (1982).
[59] See generally Financial Accounting Standards Board. Scope and Implications of the
Conceptual Framework (1976) Ihereinafter cited as FASB, Scope & Implications].
[60] For a discussion of rational choice models, see generally Pfeffer, supra note 34, at 18-22.
Rational choice models presume tht consistent goals and objectives characterize organizations.
Given a set of goals, decision-making alternatives must be chosen. The search for alternatives is
conducted only until a satisfactory alternative is found. Once a set of alternatives is uncovered,
they are assessed in terms of likely outcomes or consequences. Id. at 19.
[A]rational choice involves selecting that course of action or that alternative which maxi-
mizes the social actor's likelihood of attaining the highest value for achievement of the
preferences or goals in the objective function. ... Decisions are related systematically to
objectives; that decision is made which shows the most promise of enabling the social actor
to maximize the attainment of objectives.
Id. at 20.
Pfeffer notes that "[i]n theories of public bureaucracies, the goals are presumed to be those that
are part of the agency's mission and which enable it to fulfill its assigned role in society." Id.
[61] For a discussion of bureaucratic models of decision-making. see generally id. at 22-24. In
bureaucratic models "choices are made according to rules and processes which have been adaptive
and effective in the past." 1d. at 22. "Decisions are not made as much as they evolve from the
policies, procedures, and rules which constitute the organization and its memory." Id. at 23. The
difference between rational models, see supra note 60, and bureaucratic models is that organiza-
tions characterized by the latter "will typically have much less extensive information search and
analysis activities, and rely more heavily on rules, precedent, and standard operating procedures.
Less time and resources will be spent on decision making, and fewer alternatives will be considered
before action taken." Id. at 24.
[62] A market model may be likened to what Pfeffer calls a decision process model. See
generally id. at 25-27. In such a model, "there are no overall organizational goals being maximized
through choice, and no powerful actors with defined preferences who possess resources through
which they seek to obtain those preferences." Id. at 25. "Action occurs, but it is not primarily
motivated by conscious choice and planning." Id. at 27.
[63] For a discussion of political models of organizations, see generally id. at 27-29. Pfeffer
explains that
[Plolitical models view organizations as pluralistic and divided into various interests,
subunits, and subcultures. Conflict is viewed as normal or at least customary in political
organizations. Action does not presuppose some overarching intention. .... Because action
results from bargaining and compromise, the resulting decision seldom perfectly reflects the
preferences of any group or subunit to the organization.
Political models of choice further presume that when preferences conflict, the power of
the various social actors determines the outcome of the decision process. ... ]T]hose
interests, subunits, or individuals within the organization who possess the greatest power
will receive the greatest rewards from the interplay of organizational politics. ... Power is
used to overcome the resistance of others and obtain one's way in the organization.
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Id. at 28.
Pfeffer provides a helpful comparison of rational and bureaucratic models on the one hand and
political models on the other:
[B]ecause political activity is focused around the acquisition and use of power, it can be
distinguished from activity involved in making decisions which uses rational or bureaucratic
procedures. In both rational and bureaucratic models of choice, there is no place for and
no presumed effect of political activity. Decisions are made to best achieve the organization's
goals, either by relying on the best information and options that have been uncovered, or by
using rules and procedures which have evolved in the organization. Political activity, by
contrast, implies the conscious effort to muster and use force to overcome opposition in a
choice situation.
Id. at 7.
[64] Thus, the FASB is a policy-making group.
[651 Chambers, Accounting Principles or Accounting Policies?, J. Acct., May 1973. at 48, 52.
[661 See, e.g., May and Sundem, Research for Accounting Policy: An Overview 51 Acct. Rev.
747 (1976) [hereinafter cited as May & Sundem].
1671 FASB, Scope & Implications, supra note 59, at 2. The Board states:
A conceptual framework is a constitution, a coherent system of interrelated objectives and
fundamentals that can lead to consistent standards and that prescribes the nature, function,
and limits of financial accounting and financial statements. The objectives identify the goals
and purposes of accounting. The fundamentals are the underlying concepts of accounting,
concepts that guide the selection of events to be accounted for, the measurement of those
events, and the means of summarizing and communicating them to interested parties.
Concepts of that type are fundamental in the sense that other concepts flow from them and
repeated reference to them will be necessary in establishing, interpreting, and applying
accounting and reporting standards.
Id.
See Horngren. Uses and Limitations of a Conceptual Franeivork, J. Acct., April 1981, at 86.
88-89, which is the basis for the three paragraphs in this section.
[68] See Fiflis, Kripke & Foster, supra note 41, at 234-36. The FASB issued Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 19 (1977), which outlawed the full costing method of
accounting and prescribed rules for the successful efforts method. The SEC. responding to pressure
from small oil producers, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Energy, and the
Department of Justice, issued SECC Accounting Series Rel. No. 253, Adoption of Requirements
for Financial Accounting and Reporting Practices for Oil and Gas Producing Activities (Aug. 31.
1978), which stated that companies could use either successful efforts or full costing but also were
required to disclose in either case supplementary information regarding the value of their oil and
gas reserves. The FASB was forced to rescind its prohibition of full costing. Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 25, Suspension of Certain Accounting Requirements for Oil and Gas
Producing Companies (Feb. 1979).
[69] See generally Newman, supra note 13.
[70] "[W]hen preferences conflict, the power of the various social actors determines the
outcome of the decision process." Pfeffer, supra note 34. at 28.
[71] "iTlhose interests, subunits, or individuals within the organization who possess the
greatest power, will receive the greatest rewards from the interplay of organizational politics."
Those with power will be able to "overcome the resistance of others and obtain [their] way in the
organization." Id.
[72] Examples of this literature include, Watts and Zimmerman, The Denand for and Supply of
Accounting Theories: The Market for Excuses, 54 Acct. Rev. 273 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Watts
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& Zimmerman]; Christenson, The Methodology of Positive Accounting 58 Acct. Rev. 1 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Christenson]; Jensen, Organization Theory and MethodologD, 58 Acct. Rev. 319
(1983).
[73] See generally Pacter, supra note 22, at 76.
[74] Pfeffer, supra note 34, at 71.
[75] For a variety of proposals and criticisms, see May and Sundem, supra note 66; Watts &
Zimmerman, supra note 72; Christenson, supra note 72.
[761 Bauer, The Study of Policy Formation: An Introduction, in The Study of Policy Formula-
tion I (Bauer & Gergen eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Bauer].
[77] Id. at 21. See generally Gergen, Assessing the Leverage Points in the Process of Policy
Formation, in Bauer, supra note 76, at 181.
[78] The SEC chief accountant is the person through whom the SEC "has maintained oversight
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and its predecessor standard-setting bodies," with
respect to the relationship between the work of these bodies and the Commission's responsibility
to insure appropriate disclosure in financial statements filed pursuant to the federal securities laws.
Letter from Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the SEC, to Senator Lee Metcalf (April 30, 1976).
reprinted in Staff Study, supra note 1, at 1457.
[79] See Horngren, Marketing of Accounting Standards, supra note 19, at 64.
[801 Id.
[81] SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 190, Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Regulation
S-X Requiring Disclosure of Certain Replacement Cost Data (Mar. 23, 1976). SEC Accounting
Series Rel. No. 271, Deletion of Requirement to Disclose Replacement Cost Information (Oct. 23,
1979), repealed the requirement to disclose replacement cost information for financial statements
for fiscal years ending on or after Dec. 25, 1980.
[82] See generally Fiflis, Kripke & Foster. supra note 41, at 747-49. For example, after a
troubled history, both the APB and SEC agreed that the investment tax credit should be deferred
when it was to be reinstated in 1971. Congress provided, however, that no taxpayer shall be
required to use any particular method of accounting for the credit. Pub. L. No. 92-178. § 101(c),
85 Stat. 499 (1971). This frustrated any attempt to resolve the issue.
[83] See generally Fiflis, Kripke & Foster, supra note 41, at 815-27. Changes proposed by the
FASB regarding accounting in this area are subject to controversy. See FASB, Preliminary Views.
Employers' Accounting Pensions and Other Post-employment Benefits (1982).
[84] The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is the major U.S.
professional association in the private sector that regulates the quality of external auditors (CPAs)
and prepares the Uniform CPA Examination. Horngren, supra note 6, at 940. For a thorough
analysis of the AICPA and its activities, see Staff Study, supra note 1, at 70-130.
[85] See supra note 5.
[861 For example, one of the recommendations of the Senate Staff Study is that the SEC
establish auditing standards and enforce standards of conduct for independent auditors. Staff
Study, supra note 1, at 20-24.
[87] Congress, of course, may mandate that the SEC not delegate any authority to any other
organizations, whereas the SEC, as the agency with which authority rests to promulgate securities
regulations, may in whole or in part ignore the mandates of the private sector. The SEC is
presently under no statutory compulsion to look to the accounting profession's standard setting
body for establishing accounting standards. See Exchange Act § 3b(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(1)
(1982). The SEC could simply reverse Accounting Series Release No. 150.
[88] In 1970, the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) was formed by the U.S. Congress
to establish uniform cost accounting standards, which must be used by defense contractors and
federal agencies in estimating, accumulating, and reporting costs in connection with negotiated
contracts. Pub. L. 91-379, § 103, 84 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2168
(1982)). "Negotiated" means that the price is tied to costs rather than to competitive bidding. One
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of the problems that led to the formation of this board was that of how costs should be allocated
among contracts and among commercial and defense products.
The CASB was terminated in 1980 because its major mission had been accomplished. However,
the CASB's rules, regulations, and standards have been included in the major federal government
procurement regulations and will continue to have the full force and effect of law.
The purpose of standards is to obtain a "fair" price for both buyer and seller. That is, the
standards focus on ways of using a "cost accounting pricing system" as a substitute for the "free
market pricing system." Horngren, supra note 6. at 511-12.
[89] The Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, ch. 946, 64 Stat. 834 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§
65-67 (1982)) provides that the "Comptroller General of the United States ... shall prescribe the
principles, standards and related requirements for accounting to be observed by each executive
agency...."
At the present time, the Comptroller General has no authority or responsibility to set
accounting rules, principles or standards which must be followed by business or accounting firms.
Letter from Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, to Senator Lee Metcalf
(March 31, 1976). reprinted in Staff Study, supra note 1, at 1587.
1901 See supra note 78.
[91] The Committee on Accounting Procedure was established in 1938 by the AICPA to define
recommended accounting practices. Its opinions were stated in a series of publications called
"Accounting Research Bulletins" (ARBs). The Committee went out of existence in 1959, when its
functions were assumed by a successor agency. the Accounting Principles Board. Conference
Board, Report No. 762, Identifying Accounting Principles: the Process of Developing Financial
Reporting Standards and Rules in the United States 16-17 (1979).
[921 See supra note 2.
[93] I was exposed to this idea when I attended my first annual meeting of the American
Accounting Association in Madison in 1957. I listened to Leonard Spacek's address: Spacek, The
Need for an Accounting Court, 33 Acct. Rev. 368 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Spacek]. Sterling,
supra note 32, at 67, regards accountants as having a judicial role that deserves government
backing. However, this need not entail "the government's writing a rule book of individual
detailed practices." Sterling suggests government intervention that gives "power to the CPA to
enforce his decisions without specifying the particular decision. This is the way that a judge
operates.' Id.
[941 Spacek states: "From a professional point of view, we need the case method of arriving at
decisions on accounting principles. We need it so that not only the accounting profession, but also
industry, government, teachers, and students will know the views that prevail in arriving at
accepted principles, and why they prevail." Spacek, supra note 93, at 375.
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